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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. economy endured a lurid plunge in 2001. By March, the
U.S. economy had descended into its first recession in almost a
1
In 2001, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell seven
decade.
2
percent, the largest percentage drop since 1981, while the Nasdaq
3
composite fell over twenty-one percent. Unemployment rates rose
each month in the latter half of 2001, culminating at a 5.8%
unemployment rate, the highest level of unemployment since April of
4
1995. Compounding these troubling economic realities, the average
household owed more than $8,000 in credit-card debt at the end of
5
2001. Such large amounts of debt can be an unmanageable burden
1. See Economists Call It Recession, CNNMONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2001/
11/26/economy/recession/index.htm (Nov. 26, 2001) (citing a report published by
the National Bureau of Economic Research that based its findings on monthly
employment, industrial production, incomes, and sales data) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
2. See E.S. Browning, After Two Years of Suffering, Investors Hope for a Rebound,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A1 (noting that the Dow Jones industrial average fell
7.1% during 2001, the largest percentage decline for the Dow since 1981, when the
index fell 9.23%), available at http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB1009575912
654276400.htm.
3. See id. (stating that the 21.05% drop in the Nasdaq Composite Index in 2001
was less than the 39.29% drop in 2000), available at http://interactive.wsj.com
/articles/SB1009575912654276400.htm.
4. See U.S. Unemployment Rises, CNNMONEY, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/
01/04/economy/economy (Jan. 4, 2002) (noting that the Labor Department’s
statistics indicate that the economy has lost 1.4 million jobs since March 2001) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
5. See Jeanie Sahadi, Debt Overload: 5 Red Flags, CNNMONEY, at http://money.
cnn.com/2001/10/07/debt/q_debt/ (Oct. 8, 2001) (quoting a CardWeb.com
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for individuals facing layoffs incident to the economic slowdown.
The bankruptcy system provides debtors with relief from debt’s
6
harsh realities, but changes to the bankruptcy laws are coming. The
107th Congress is in the final stages of enacting the Bankruptcy
7
Reform Act of 2001(“Reform Act”), an ambitious overhaul of the
8
U.S. bankruptcy system. Final passage of the Reform Act merely
9
requires reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the bill,
10
which are substantially “similar” and President Bush’s “promised”
11
signature.
Because of the economic downturn of 2001, bankruptcy reforms
will affect the average consumer. The Reform Act presents a marked
change in the bankruptcy field for consumer debtors. For example,
12
the Reform Act creates the “means test,” and an eligibility
13
requirement under Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which will prevent
household study that found the average credit card balance per U.S. household
equaled $8,523) (on file with the American University Law Review). According to a
Myvesta.org study, the average credit card balance per person was $2,814. Id.
6. See discussion infra Part I.C (noting how the U.S. bankruptcy system provides
relief to debtors by discharging much of their indebtedness).
7. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001), currently
referred to as the Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2002. H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. (2002).
8. See Peter Spero, Impact of Bankruptcy Reform Legislation on Asset Protection, 28
EST. PLAN. 291, 291 (2001) (stating that passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001 is a “virtual certainty,” and noting that both the House and Senate have passed
similar versions and that the “President has said that he will sign it.”).
9. See generally S. 420.
10. See id. (noting the similarities between the House and Senate versions of the
Reform Act). See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
11. See W. Clarkson McDow, Jr., The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 and Its Impact on
Consumer Lawyers, 13 Aug. S.C. LAW. 32, 33 (July/Aug. 2001) (stating that as of
August, 2001, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 has passed both Houses of
Congress and the “President has promised to sign it.”). The House-Senate
conference committee on the bankruptcy legislation was originally scheduled to
convene on September 12, 2001, but because of the events of September 11, they did
not convene until November 14, 2001. The committee’s chairman, House Judiciary
Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), noted that the Reform Act probably would
not be completed by the Conference Committee until 2002. American Bankruptcy
Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines: Sept. 11 Plays Role in Opinions During
Bankruptcy Panel Meeting, Daily Bankruptcy Review, at http://www.abiworld.org/
headlines/TODAY.html (Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with the American University Law
Review). Currently, an agreed upon conference committee report is tied up in the
House of Representatives because of a disagreement regarding an abortion provision
entirely unrelated to the analysis of this Comment. See American Bankruptcy
Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines: Bankruptcy “Agreement” Hits New Snag in
House, Daily Bankruptcy Review, at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/02july29.
html (July 29, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (detailing the Reform Act’s means test).
13. Chapter 7 bankruptcy is a liquidation proceeding in which a trustee collects
the debtor’s nonexempt assets, converts them to cash, and pays the claims of the
debtor’s creditors with this cash. See JOHN H. WILLIAMSON, THE ATTORNEY’S
HANDBOOK ON SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 20 (Argyle Pub.
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debtors with the financial ability to repay a portion of their debt from
14
receiving an unconditional discharge under Chapter 7.
Although limiting access to bankruptcy relief at a time of economic
uncertainty seems counterintuitive, this reform is a response to what
some observers have called a “bankruptcy crisis” caused by rampant
15
debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system. The data supporting that
contention is compelling.
In the 1990s the United States
16
experienced its largest and longest period of economic growth,
17
coupled with record low unemployment rates, yet personal
18
bankruptcy filings rose seventy-two percent between 1994 and 1998.
During that same period of increased personal filings, corporate
19
bankruptcy filings steadily declined.
Therein lies the paradox: a booming economy and increasing
personal bankruptcy filings. The Reform Act is premised on the
belief that this paradox exists because current consumer bankruptcy
laws are too lenient, allowing individuals with future earnings
potential to seek a full discharge of large unsecured debts without
20
any future recourse or consequences.
To limit abuse of the
5th ed. 1998) (noting that if debtors do not wish to liquidate their assets, they should
file for a reorganization of their debts under Chapter 13).
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1; see also McDow, supra note 11, at 33 (noting
the change from the current subjective substantial abuse test under 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) to a proposed objective means test). Those debtors who fail to meet the
proposed eligibility requirements will either have their filing dismissed or converted
to a Chapter 13 filing, thereby requiring them to repay a portion of their debt
pursuant to a Chapter 13 plan. See Spero, supra note 8, at 291 (discussing reports
that, as a general rule, families of four with income of $52,000 would be required to
file under Chapter 13).
15. See generally Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Consumer Filings in a Complex
Economy, 18 Jan. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (Dec./Jan. 2000) (arguing that the substantial
increase in personal bankruptcy filings is due to debtor abuse as opposed to
traditional causal explanations like recession, depression, inflation, or high
unemployment).
16. See supra note 1 (noting the recession that started in March ended a ten-year
period of economic expansion, the longest in U.S. history, topping a growth period
of eight years and ten months that took place in the 1960s).
17. According to the Bureau of Labor’s Statistics, between 1998-99, the “civilian
labor force grew 1.3 million and unemployment fell to 4.2 percent.” Bermant &
Flynn, supra note 15, at 22.
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 5 (2001) (citing data provided by the
Administrative Office for United States Courts).
19. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001 (Business, Non-Business, Total), ABI
WORLD, at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2002) (providing data that shows a fifty percent decline in business filings between
1990-2000 from 71,549 filings in 1991 to 35,472 filings in 2000 as opposed to nonbusiness filings which have almost doubled from 718,107 in 1990 to 1,217,972 in
2000) (on file with the American University Law Review); see also Bermant & Flynn,
supra note 15, at 22 (noting that the recent fall in Chapter 11 filings led to suspicion
of serious flaws in the consumer bankruptcy system that present inappropriate
temptations to prospective filers).
20. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the paradox of the current bankruptcy
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bankruptcy system, Congress has proposed that a means test be
21
utilized to determine eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.
This Comment addresses the bankruptcy eligibility aspects of the
Reform Act and analyzes them in practical, legal, equitable, and
economic contexts. Part I outlines the historical evolution of the
eligibility standard under the consumer bankruptcy system in the
United States. Part II details how the Reform Act will affect
consumers’ current eligibility for bankruptcy protection. Part III
analyzes these details and presents legal, equitable, and economic
reasons for passing the Reform Act. Finally, Part IV concludes by
recommending passage of the Reform Act because it will unify
current consumer bankruptcy law, prevent morally repugnant and
socially undesirable discharges of consumer debt, and provide a longterm economic stimulus to the ailing U.S. economy by ensuring the
availability of affordable consumer credit.
I.

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM

A typical personal bankruptcy action involves a debtor voluntarily
or involuntarily liquidating all pre-determined non-exempt assets in
favor of creditors in return for a discharge of debts owed to these
22
creditors. Evolving U.S. bankruptcy laws have addressed each aspect
23
of the typical personal bankruptcy filing in different ways.
A. The Creation and Early Development of Bankruptcy Law
in the United States
Congress’ ability to formulate a bankruptcy system was first
24
enunciated in 1787, in the U.S. Constitution.
In 1800, the first
25
American bankruptcy law enacted under this charge copied the
crisis); see also S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 3 (1999) (“It is the strong view of the [Senate
Judiciary] Committee that the Bankruptcy Code’s generous, no-questions-asked
policy of providing complete debt forgiveness under chapter [sic] 7 without serious
consideration of a bankrupt’s ability to repay is deeply flawed and encourages a lack
of personal responsibility.”).
21. See discussion infra Part II (noting that the means test, by requiring
financially able debtors to repay a portion of their debt, will prevent debtors from
abusing the bankruptcy system).
22. See Richard E. Coulson, Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of
Debtor Qualifications for Bankruptcy Discharge, 62 ALB. L. REV. 467, 470-71 (1998)
(describing a “traditional Chapter 7 scenario”).
23. See id. (indicating that the roles of the in a traditional Chapter 7 scenario vary
according to the applicable law at the time of the filing); see also discussion infra Parts
I.A, I.B, I.C.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress has the right to establish
“uniform laws of bankruptcy”).
25. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
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26

English bankruptcy law of that time. The American law was “limited
to creditor-initiated petitions against merchants,” thereby having little
27
applicability to the average consumer debtor.
Congress quickly repealed the first law in 1803, but passed another
28
in 1841. The second law made bankruptcy available to voluntary
29
The debtor entering bankruptcy was
debtors for the first time.
required to surrender all non-exempt property for liquidation to pay
30
off as much of his debts as the liquidated assets would allow. In
31
exchange, all of the debtor’s debts would be “discharged.”
However, if a majority of the creditors—in number or in value—
32
holding proven debts objected, they could deny the discharge.
33
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (“1867 Act”) slightly modified these
34
requirements. Pursuant to the 1867 Act, creditor consent was not
35
required for filings before June 1, 1868. If the debtor’s non-exempt
assets did not satisfy a fifty percent or larger portion of the total debt,
a discharge would still require the consent of a majority—in either
36
number or value—of the creditors.

26. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 1-2 (1993) (describing the
similarities between the first codified American bankruptcy law and the English
version as essentially being procedural in nature).
27. Id. at 1.
28. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 473 (stating that the second attempt at a
codified bankruptcy law in the United States was a direct response to the economic
panic of 1837).
29. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 349 (1991) (maintaining that the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was
the “first time in Anglo-American jurisprudence” in which voluntary bankruptcy was
allowed).
30. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 473-74 (explaining that the exempt property
included household and kitchen furniture and other articles judged necessary, such
as clothing, but these items were not to exceed $300).
31. See id. at 474 (“The 1841 discharge included all the debts, if, as before, the
debtor surrendered his property, complied with all court orders, and conformed
with the Act.”).
32. See id. (recognizing that a debtor could demand a jury trial to determine
whether his filing should be approved despite creditors’ objections if it appeared that
the debtor made a full disclosure of his assets and surrendered all of his estate).
33. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, §§ 4972-5132, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed
1878).
34. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 474-76 (noting that like the 1841 Bankruptcy
Act, the 1867 Act was a response to an economic panic in 1857).
35. See id. at 476 (arguing the 1867 Act, while short lived, was a rather
sophisticated form of legislation and foreshadowed future developments in
bankruptcy law in 1898).
36. See Tabb, supra note 29, at 357 (explaining that amendments made in 1874
provided that a voluntary debtor whose non-exempt assets paid less than thirty
percent of the proven claims would not be discharged unless one-fourth of the
creditors in number and one-third in value consented as opposed to the majority of
creditors required to consent under the original 1867 language).
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37

In 1898, a “fully modern bankruptcy act” was enacted. The law
recognized for the first time the public interest in granting a
38
discharge to “honest but unfortunate” debtors. Congress promoted
the public interest by eliminating the long-standing requirements of
either creditor consent or a minimum dividend as a prerequisite for
39
obtaining a discharge. The 1898 Act codified the conditions under
40
which a discharge would not be granted. It also defined particular
41
types of debts that were “non-dischargeable” as essentially exempt
42
from a discharge.
B. The Advent of Repayment Plans
In the aforementioned consumer bankruptcy laws, the emphasis
was on the debtor receiving a fresh start after liquidation of his
43
44
assets. Changes made by the Chandler Act of 1938, however, made
45
a debtor’s future potential income an issue. It created a Chapter 13
46
bankruptcy option entitled “Wage Earners’ Plans” that allowed
47
consumer debtors to adjust their debts by using future income. The
Wage Earners’ Plans detailed and prioritized a debtor’s debt by

37. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). See Coulson, supra
note 22, at 477 (describing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
38. See Tabb, supra note 29, at 364-65 (stating that the underlying theory behind
recognizing the public interest in discharging “honest but unfortunate” debtors is
that “society as a whole benefits when an overburdened debtor is freed from the
oppressive weight of accumulated debt,” thereby allowing a debtor to “resume his or
her place as a productive member of society.”).
39. See id. (suggesting that “[t]his innovation marked as much as anything else
the arrival of the ‘modern’ American pro-debtor discharge policy”).
40. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 481 (stating that “[o]n a debtor’s application,
the court was to discharge the debtor unless she committed a bankruptcy crime, or,
with fraudulent intent, destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books from which the
debtor’s true financial condition could be determined.”).
41. See id. at 482 (defining non-dischargeable debt as debts for which the debtor
remains obligated despite bankruptcy).
42. See id. (observing that such non-dischargeable debts included “debts: (1) for
taxes; (2) based on judgments for fraud, false pretense, or willful and malicious
injuries; (3) not properly scheduled so the creditor could timely file a claim; or
(4) created by ‘fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting
as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.’”).
43. See id. at 493 (stating that “[i]n non-commercial bankruptcies, emphasis in
the past [had] been on discharge, rather than on distribution to creditors”).
44. See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930-41 (repealed 1978)
(creating the Wage Earners’ Plans).
45. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 493 (discussing the advent of a new policy in
which future assets, specifically future earnings, should be procured and used to pay
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding if available).
46. Walter Chandler, The Wage Earners’ Plan: Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REV. 169
(1961). The 1938 Chandler Act was named after Walter Chandler. Id.
47. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 493 (“Chapter 13 was the first carefully
considered effort to address the need for some consumer debtors to adjust their
debts by using future income.”)

HUBLER.PRINTER.DOC

316

12/4/2002 1:32 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:309

applying the debtor’s future income to pay off all or a portion of the
debt according to set priorities while leaving “a sufficient amount . . .
48
for the support of his family and himself.” The plans required the
consent of a majority of the creditors with claims, and of each
49
affected, secured creditor. The debtor received his discharge upon
execution of the plan subject to his satisfactory compliance with the
50
plan throughout its duration.
51
The Chapter 13 option was never the “preferred mode” for most
consumer debtors when compared to the more conventional option
52
of liquidation of a debtor’s assets option. Most debtors chose to free
their future earnings from prior credit claims by filing for a voluntary
liquidation, regardless of whether their future earnings could pay
53
down some, if not all, of their debt. This phenomenon of consumer
debt avoidance would become the justification for the creditors’
rallying cry for bankruptcy reform, eventually culminating in the
54
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
C. The Next Phase of U.S. Bankruptcy Law: The Push for a Mandatory
Chapter 13 and the Advent of Substantial Abuse
In the 1960s, the credit industry began a push to overhaul the
bankruptcy system by mandating that all consumer debtors use
55
Chapter 13 to discharge debt. In 1964, that overhaul led to the
. 48. Chandler, supra note 46, at 169-70.
49. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 494 (explaining that “[t]he consent of a
majority of the proven claims in amount and number, and of each affected secured
creditor was necessary for confirmation.”).
50. See id. (highlighting that “after three years, if the court found that the plan
payments had not been completed ‘due to circumstances for which [the debtor]
could not be justly held accountable’” the discharge would remain in effect) (citing
Chandler Act of 1938, § 661, 52 Stat. at 936).
51. Id. at 495 (citing annual reports from the Director of the Administrations
Office of the United States Courts indicating that in 1961, only fifteen percent of the
non-business filings were for wage earner plans).
52. See id. (recognizing that in the more conventional liquidation of assets
option, a creditor could not touch a debtor’s future earnings unless: (1) a debt was
determined to be nondischargeable, (2) a discharge was denied, (3) there was an
express agreement allowing creditors access thereto).
53. See id. at 495-96 (noting that an individual with nominal assets and a
significant future earnings potential could choose to liquidate his nominal assets,
repay his creditors to a nominal extent while receiving a discharge, and prevent
access to his large future earning ability).
54. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the advent of “substantial abuse” and its
application to potentially abusive debtors).
55. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 500 (noting that the credit industry’s efforts to
amend the bankruptcy laws were similar to legislation in the 1930s that was
denounced as “un-American”); Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual
Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV.
809, 821 (1983) (stating that the proposed legislation resembled the English practice
of conditional or suspended discharge).
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56

introduction of House Bill 12,784, which would have amended the
bankruptcy laws to require a wage earning debtor, seeking relief
under a liquidation plan, to show that relief under Chapter 13 would
57
be inadequate. However, House Bill 12,784 never emerged from
58
committee. The credit industry introduced identical legislation in
59
60
1965 and 1967, but those pieces of legislation also failed to emerge
from committee. Similarly, in 1965, legislation was introduced in the
61
Senate, which would have created a new section in the bankruptcy
62
laws mandating that debtors file under Chapter 13. The Senate Bill
63
also failed to gain enough support to pass committee.
Even though none of the mandatory Chapter 13 requirements
became law, the credit industry’s pressure on Congress led to the
creation of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws (“Commission”) to
“study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes” for establishing a
64
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States. One
of the Commission’s purposes was to study legislative solutions to
65
handle the increasing number of consumer bankruptcies. In 1973,
after a two-year study, the Commission reported its findings on the
66
feasibility of a mandatory Chapter 13 for all consumer debtors. The
67
Commission soundly rejected a mandatory Chapter 13 law, citing
among other reasons that such a requirement “would be almost
56. See H.R. 12,784, 88th Cong. (1964) (stating that the judge or referee shall
determine at the first meeting of creditors whether the wage earning debtor has
shown that adequate relief cannot be obtained under Chapter 13).
57. See id. (permitting non-wage earning debtors and wage earning debtors who
showed that Chapter 13 relief is inadequate to proceed under a liquidation plan).
58. Coulson, supra note 22, at 500; Countryman, supra note 55, at 821.
59. H.R. 292, 89th Cong. (1965).
60. H.R. 1057, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5771, 90th Cong. (1967).
61. S. 613, 89th Cong. (1965).
62. See id. (authorizing the court “upon application of any creditor or upon its
own motion, whenever it determines it to be feasible and desirable, and for the best
interests of the creditors, [to] order any voluntary bankrupt who is receiving salary or
wages to file a petition under . . . [Chapter 13]”).
63. Coulson, supra note 22, at 500. See Countryman, supra note 55, at 821 (noting
that further attempts to enact similar legislation failed in the 1970s).
64. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 468, 468 (stating
that during the study the Commission shall consider basic philosophy of bankruptcy,
causes of bankruptcy, and alternatives to the bankruptcy system).
65. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-927 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3559, 3560
(stating that the number of bankruptcies over the past twenty years increased by
1000% and consumer bankruptcies accounted for 90% of that increase).
66. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, at App. Pt. 4-409
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. Rev. 2001) (Appendix 4(c)) (reporting that the
Commission reviewed Chapter 13 usage in areas in which this type of relief was most
extensively used, such as Alabama, Ohio, California, Georgia, Tennessee, Kansas, and
Maine).
67. See id. at App. Pt. 4, 412 (stating that new bankruptcy laws should promote
Chapter 13 so that debtors know all available relief).
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bound to encourage debtors to change employment and, if necessary,
to move to another area to escape the importuning calls and
68
correspondence of his creditors.” As a result of the Commission’s
69
conclusions, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“1978 Act”) did
70
not include any mandatory Chapter 13 provisions.
The credit industry responded to the 1978 Act by pushing to
reform what creditors perceived to be “an undue bias toward
71
bankrupts.” Similar to the credit industry’s push in the 1960s to
mandate Chapter 13, legislation was introduced to restrict access to
72
73
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The proposed legislation in the House and
74
Senate sought to limit Chapter 7 to debtors who could not afford to
pay a reasonable amount of their debts pursuant to a Chapter 13
75
plan.
Although neither piece of legislation immediately changed the use
76
77
of Chapter 13, a study by Robert W. Johnson, a professor at Purdue
University’s Credit Research Center (“Purdue Study”), added fuel to
78
the credit union’s building fire. The Purdue Study concluded that
$1.1 billion of the debt discharged annually under Chapter 7 could
79
be repaid by debtors’ future income.
While critics attacked the
68. See id. at App. Pt. 4, 411-12 (stating that a mandatory Chapter 13 plan would
force a debtor and the debtor’s family to live within the constraints of the plan to the
end and thus appeared to be debtor peonage).
69. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
70. Coulson, supra note 22, at 501.
71. Paul M. Black & Michael J. Herbert, Bankcard’s Revenge: A Critique of the 1984
Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 845 (1985).
The 1978 Act “was branded a debtor’s paradise practically beckoning borrowers to
shed their debts painlessly and needlessly.” Id.
72. Coulson, supra note 22, at 501. Two years after the enactment of the 1978
Act, legislation was introduced in the House and Senate limiting debtors access to
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id. The 1978 Act named the liquidation of assets form of
bankruptcy as Chapter 7. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, § 721, 92 Stat. at 2606.
73. See H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981) (providing that “an individual may be a
debtor under chapter 7 . . . only if such individual cannot pay a reasonable portion of
his debts out of anticipated future income”).
74. See S. 2000, 97th Cong. § 2(c) (1981) (prohibiting individuals from being a
debtor under Chapter 7 if they could pay “a substantial percentage of the
outstanding debt” out of anticipated future income).
75. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 501-02 (noting that the definitions in the
legislation did not provide much guidance on fluid concepts, such as anticipated
future income).
76. See id. at 502 (indicating that Congress did not pass either bill due to the lack
of uniform support for bankruptcy reform at that time).
77. 1 CREDIT RES. CTR., PURDUE UNIV., CONSUMER BANKR. STUDY 88-91 (1982).
The study asserted that the 1978 Act had an adverse financial impact on the credit
industry. Id.
78. See Countryman, supra note 55, at 822 (describing the credit industry’s
influence on the Purdue Study).
79. See id. (concluding that 33.1% of bankruptcy debtors could have repaid their
debts in full); see also John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the
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80

validity of this conclusion, the momentum of the credit industry’s
campaign continued when the American Bar Association endorsed
legislation allowing creditors to seek dismissal of Chapter 7 petitions
when the debtor could pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of
81
future income.
The credit industry’s momentum resulted in Senate Bill 2000 being
82
83
“reintroduced” in February of 1983 as Senate Bill 445. Originally,
Senate Bill 445, like Senate Bill 2000, contained language limiting
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to individuals who could not pay a reasonable
84
portion of their debts. By the time Senate Bill 445 was reported by
the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, the Chapter 7 language
85
had been replaced with a new “substantial abuse” test. The new test
stated that a court may dismiss a motion for discharge under Chapter
86
7 if granting relief would be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7.
Meanwhile, companion legislation in the House included similar
87
language. The substantial abuse test was eventually codified in 1984
88
as an amendment to the 1978 Act. The obfuscated origins of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 440-41 (2000) (explaining that the Purdue
Study involved a questionnaire study in two judicial districts in ten states with willing
respondents answering a series of follow-up questions).
80. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis of the Creditors’ Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1104-08 (1983) (arguing that the
Purdue Study’s methodology created a selection bias that raised significant concerns
about the data used in the conclusions); Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy
Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1338-39 (1984) (noting that the
Purdue Study lacked crucial expertise, was designed incorrectly, gathered its data
improperly, misanalyzed the statistical data, and drew erroneous and biased
inferences from the data analysis).
81. See Consumer Bankruptcy Subcommittee of the Committee on Consumer Financial
Services of the American Bar Association, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 259 (1982)
(recommending the dismissal of Chapter 7 cases when the debtor is able to allocate
future earnings to pay a reasonable portion of his debts). The problem of Chapter 7
bankruptcy is that it is a form of equitable relief and unavailable for the asking. Id.
82. See Coulson, supra note 22, at 503 (explaining that the reintroduced bill
sought to limit Chapter 7 to individuals who could not pay a reasonable portion of
their debts out of future income).
83. Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. (1983).
84. See David L. Balser, Note, Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Roadmap With
a Proposed Standard for Defining Substantial Abuse, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1011, 1018
(1986) (stating that the “language in S. 2000 was incorporated verbatim into
S. 445”).
85. See S. 445, § 202(b) (stating that the court may dismiss a case under Chapter
7 if granting relief is a substantial abuse of Chapter 7); see also Balser, supra note 84,
at 1018 (noting that there was no explanation in the legislative history for why a
“substantial abuse” test replaced a “future income” test).
86. See S. 445, § 202(b) (creating a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor).
87. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. (1984) (proposing to amend the Bankruptcy Code
without a future income test).
88. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in various sections of title 11 of the United States Code).
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test, however, have resulted in courts interpreting “substantial abuse”
89
in a myriad of ways.
D. Interpretations of “Substantial Abuse”
The addition of the “substantial abuse” test, codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b), limited debtor access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy and is
90
currently the standard that courts employ. However, the language
91
of Section 707(b) has been the source of great interpretative debate.
92
The United States Code does not define “substantial abuse.” As a
result, the courts must develop a definition from the legislative
93
history of Section 707(b).
One of the problems with the
interpretation of “substantial abuse” is that the amendment to
94
Section 707 lacked an official committee report. The holding of In
95
re Kelly compounded this problem. The court in In re Kelly noted
that, “[t]o the extent that legislative history may be considered, it is
the official committee reports that provide the authoritative
89. See Balser, supra note 84, at 1018-19 (discussing the multiple interpretations
of substantial abuse under the 1984 Amendment).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994 & Supp. 2001) (“After a motion and a hearing,
the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at
the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an
individual debtor . . . whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of [Chapter 7—
Liquidation].”).
91. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (1989) (explaining that because “the
term ‘substantial abuse’ is not defined in the Act, the term is subject to judicial
interpretation); Robert M. Thompson, Comment, Consumer Bankruptcy: Substantial
Abuse and Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 MO. L. REV. 247, 254 (1990) (stating
that substantial abuse is not defined in the bankruptcy code and has been left to
judicial interpretation).
93. See generally Coulson, supra note 22, at 506-07 (noting that courts have
encountered interpretive difficulties in attempting to quantify substantial abuse
under § 707 with legislative history analysis).
94. See Thompson, supra note 92, at 251-52 (explaining that no official
committee report exists for the amendments to § 707, and that this lack of a formal
legislative history has allowed courts to “rummage through the closet of the
Congressional Record” to find anything that might provide some interpretative
guidance); see also Tamara O. Mitchell, Dismissal of Cases Via 11 U.S.C. §707: Bad Faith
and Substantial Abuse, 102 COM. L.J. 355, 359 (1997) (highlighting the fact that in
addition to an absence of official committee reports, there are also conflicting floor
statements regarding the provision). But see Coulson, supra note 22, at 503-04 (citing
Susan Block-Lieb’s research stating that after the introduction of the substantial
abuse language in S. 445, Senator Metzenbaum reported to the Judiciary Committee
that he had “successfully worked out with the author of this amendment the total
elimination of the future income language . . . the future income matter is no longer
in the legislation.”). Representative Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee during debates on H.R. 5174, inserted into the Congressional Record a
few days after passage of the bill the statement that the substantial abuse language
“would not create a future income test.” Coulson, supra note 22, at 504.
95. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
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expression of legislative intent . . . [not the] stray comments by
96
individual legislators.” Therefore, the interpretation of substantial
97
abuse has been a challenging jurisprudential endeavor.
Commentators have classified the circuit courts’ interpretations of
98
99
“substantial abuse” into three categories. The Ninth Circuit, in In
100
re Kelly, set forth the first mode of interpretation, holding that the
debtor’s ability to pay was the principal factor to be considered in the
101
substantial abuse determination. The court noted, however, that an
inability to pay debts would not “shield a debtor” from dismissal
102
under section 707(b) when bad faith was otherwise shown.
The
103
Eighth Circuit developed a similar rule in In re Walton, noting that
while Section 707(b) considers a petitioner’s good faith and unique
104
hardships, the debtor’s ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan is the
105
primary factor in determining substantial abuse.
106
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in In re Krohn laid out the second
107
mode of interpretation of substantial abuse The court assessed two
108
factors: (1) whether the debtor is seeking a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
96. Id. at 912 n.3 (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)).
97. See generally Coulson, supra note 22, at 506-07 (noting the varied
interpretations courts have made in defining substantial abuse).
98. See id. at 506-08 (highlighting the several general categories of interpretation
of substantial abuse under § 707(b)).
99. See Thompson, supra note 92, at 256-57 (stating that there are three separate
modes of judicial interpretation for defining substantial abuse). Only four of the
eleven circuit courts have defined substantial abuse under § 707(b), with each having
a different position on the matter. Id. See also Michael D. Bruckman, Note, The
Thickening Fog of “Substantial Abuse”: Can 707(a) Help Clear the Air?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 193, 195-98 (1994) (dividing the analysis of substantial abuse into three
categories: (1) a Chapter 13 per se approach; (2) a Chapter 13 “plus” approach; and
(3) a totality of the circumstances approach).
100. See 841 F.2d at 914 (concluding that debtors able to repay approximately
ninety-nine percent of their unsecured debt do not require Chapter 7 protection).
101. See id. at 914-15 (noting that the “overwhelming majority of the courts
considering the issue” have adopted this rule consistent with congressional intent, as
the committee report on S. 445 indicates).
102. Id. at 915.
103. See 866 F.2d 981, 982 (8th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a debtor’s Chapter 7 case on
grounds of substantial abuse because the debtor’s monthly income was $1,818, and
monthly expenses were $1,321, leaving a surplus of $497 with which the debtor could
pay off debts under a Chapter 13 plan).
104. Id. at 983.
105. See id. at 984 (“The primary factor that may indicate substantial abuse is the
ability of the debtor to repay the debts out of future disposable income.”) (quoting
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 707.07, at 707-19 (15th ed. 1988)).
106. 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989).
107. See id. at 127 (holding that a debtor who had ample future income, a
financial situation that was not the product of an unforeseen or catastrophic event,
and had lived on a “catalog of excesses” should have a Chapter 7 filing dismissed for
substantial abuse).
108. See id. at 126-27 (noting that need and honesty are two primary factors in
ascertaining substantial abuse).
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109

for “honest” reasons; and (2) whether the debtor is “needy” as
determined by a debtor’s ability to pay his debts out of future
110
The court “cautioned,” however, that a debtor’s
earnings.
ineligibility for Chapter 13 relief alone would not be the decisive
111
factor in dismissal under section 707(b).
112
The Fourth Circuit, in In re Green, established the third mode of
113
interpretation. Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s position that ability to
114
repay debts is a decisive factor, the court pointed to the 1984
bankruptcy amendments in which Congress rejected a threshold
115
future income or ability to repay test.
The Fourth Circuit then
116
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach, to be applied
117
Although an ability to repay debts is a
on a case-by-case basis.
primary factor under this approach, it cannot be the sole basis for
118
finding that a debtor has substantially abused the process.

109. See id. at 126 (highlighting other factors relevant to honesty, including:
(1) the debtor’s good faith and candor in filing schedules and other documents;
(2) whether he was engaged in “eve of bankruptcy purchases;” and (3) whether he
was forced into Chapter 7 by unforeseen or catastrophic events).
110. See id. at 126-27 (stating that other factors relevant to need include:
(1) whether a debtor enjoys a stable source of future income; (2) whether he is
eligible for adjustment of his debts through Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code;
(3) whether there are state remedies with the potential to ease his financial
predicament; (4) the degree of relief obtainable through private negotiations; (5)
the degree of relief obtainable through private negotiations; and (6) whether a
debtor’s expenses can be reduced significantly without depriving him of adequate
food, clothing, shelter and other necessities).
111. See id. at 127 (noting that a “bright-line” test would encourage debtors to run
up unsecured debts in excess of $100,000, thereby avoiding dedication of future
earnings to debt retirement under Chapter 13).
112. 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
113. See id. at 573 (remanding the case to the district court for determination of
substantial abuse based on a “totality of the circumstances” analysis).
114. See id. at 571-72 (rejecting the rule of In re Kelly on the basis that the court in
that case made an unsupported logical leap in concluding the ability to repay debt is
a decisive factor in evaluating substantial abuse).
115. See id. (noting that the cases supporting the rule established in In re Kelly only
supported the employment of repayment ability as one of several factors).
116. See id. at 572 (noting that employing a totality of the circumstances approach
allows the court to determine more accurately whether the particular debtor’s case
invokes the real concern behind Section 707(b)—a debtor abusing the bankruptcy
process by taking advantage of creditors).
117. See id. (stating that the totality of the circumstances approach involves an
evaluation of factors such as: “(1) whether the debtor filed the bankruptcy because
of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) whether the debtor
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of his ability to
repay; (3) whether the debtor’s proposed family budget is excessive or unreasonable;
(4) whether the debtor’s schedules and statement of current income and expenses
reasonably and accurately reflect his financial condition; and (5) whether the debtor
filed in good faith”).
118. See id. (suggesting that while a debtor’s ability to repay may raise an inference
that there is substantial abuse, it does not by itself demonstrate such abuse).
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FORMULATION

Legislative Formulation of the Reform Act

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (“Reform Act”) is a
119
culmination of several years of congressional work, as debate on
120
how to reform the system began in 1997.
The 106th Congress
passed the Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, which was
121
122
to the Reform Act of 2001.
However,
“virtually identical”
President Clinton pocket-vetoed the conference report on December
123
19, 2000.
Another attempt at reformation in the 107th Congress
commenced on January 31, 2001, an effort that came to be known as
124
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001.
Currently, a conference
committee is reconciling the House and Senate versions of the
Reform Act, making it likely that the Act will not face a full vote of
125
Congress until 2002.
These recent attempts to reform the U.S. bankruptcy system were a
126
response to a “bankruptcy crisis” in which a record number of
consumers filed for bankruptcy during a time of economic
127
prosperity.
The source of the crisis is debated: some suggest it is

119. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 3 (2001) (stating that “H.R. 333 is the
product of more than 3 years of Congressional consideration of bankruptcy reform
legislation” that included seventeen hearings with testimony from nearly 130
witnesses, representing “nearly every major constituency in the bankruptcy
community”).
120. See id. (noting that bankruptcy reform legislation began in the 105th
Congress with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 that had a
conference report passed by “veto proof” margins, and was followed by the 106th
Congress and House Bill 2415).
121. Id.
122. See generally Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th
Cong. (2000) (proposing reform to the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system by limiting
access to Chapter 7 relief to debtors capable of paying a portion of their debts).
123. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 3 (highlighting the demise of the GekasGrassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000).
124. See Linda Reid, Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, The Good, the Bad and the
Unknown, 36 ARK. LAW. 17, 17 (2001) (outlining the in-depth legislative history of the
current bankruptcy reform legislation). On July 18, 2001, the Senate voted 82-to-16
to adopt the Senate’s language to the reform measure under the same bill number of
the House-passed House Bill 333. See id. (noting that this action made the Senate
and House versions virtually indistinguishable).
125. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that the Reform Act is
currently tied up in the House of Representatives on an unrelated amendment
dealing with bankruptcy treatment of abortion protestors).
126. Bermant & Flynn, supra note 15, at 22.
127. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (highlighting the irony of having a
record number of consumers filing for bankruptcy during a time of economic
prosperity).
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128

due to consumer abuse of the system, while others contend that
credit card providers’ aggressive marketing to low-income households
129
spawned the crisis. Despite this debate, the legislative history of the
Reform Act indicates that Congress believed that consumer abuse
130
caused the crisis.
Therefore, the Reform Act can be properly
regarded as an attempt to address and eliminate perceived consumer
abuse.
B. The Legislative Details for Eligibility Under the Reform Act
131

The Reform Act proposes substantial changes to the current U.S.
132
bankruptcy system, as codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). Structurally,
the Reform Act changes the “Dismissal” heading of section 707 to
“Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under Chapter 11 or
133
13.” The Act also replaces the debated “substantial abuse” language
134
in section 707(b) with only “abuse.”
The most important substantive change for consumer debtors,
however, is that, with the imposition of a means test, the proposed
135
reform actually defines “abuse.”
The means test is significant
because a debtor now faces a presumption of abuse in every Chapter
136
7 filing that fails the means test. However, a debtor may still avoid
dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 7 filing even when he fails the
means test if his household income is less than the household median
137
income for his state of residency.
The Reform Act of 2001
128. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the current
paradoxical bankruptcy crisis).
129. See Stephen Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America: Recent Trends in Bank
Credit Card Marketing and Indebtedness, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE,
at http://www.abiworld.org/research/cfa_credit_study_7-98.html (July 1998)
(reporting on studies conducted in 1998 that attempted to ascertain the tendencies
of the consumer credit industry) (on file with the American University Law Review).
130. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, pt. 1, at 5 (2001) (stating that House Bill 333 was
formulated to respond to many of the factors contributing to the increase in
consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability, the
proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to eliminate
abuse in the system).
131. This Comment will refer to both Senate Bill 420 and House Bill 333 as the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. The sections addressing a consumer’s ability to file under
Chapter 7 are identical under the two versions. See supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
132. See infra notes 133-158 and accompanying text (elaborating on the changes to
the United States bankruptcy system).
133. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R.
333, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (noting the details of the means test for a
debtor’s eligibility to receive a Chapter 7 discharge under the Reform Act).
137. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the median income test).
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essentially provides debtors with two independent tests for eligibility
under Chapter 7: (1) a means test and (2) a median income test.
1.

Test 1: The means test and defeating the presumption of abuse
Under the means test, the focus of the judicial inquiry is the
138
As was mentioned
debtor’s ratio of income to unsecured debt.
above, there is a presumption of abuse applied to all debtors who fail
139
the means test.
The debtor passes the means test only when the
debtor’s “excess income”—calculated by reducing current monthly
140
141
income by specific categories of expenses and multiplied by
sixty—is greater than or equal to the lesser of either: (1) twenty-five
percent of the debtor’s non-priority unsecured claims in the case, or
142
$6,000, whichever is greater; or (2) $10,000.
This complicated test implies that a consumer debtor, regardless of
debt total, is ineligible for a full Chapter 7 discharge under the
143
means test if the amount of their excess income exceeds $10,000.
However, if a debtor owes between $24,000 and $48,000 in unsecured
debt, the excess income figure cannot exceed twenty-five percent of
144
the amount owed.
For those who owe less than $24,000 in
unsecured debt, their excess income figure must be less than $6,000
145
to be eligible for Chapter 7 discharge.
Definitions of monthly income and expenses are critical to the
evaluation of a filing under the means test. Income is defined as the
average monthly income the debtor earns during the six-month
146
period preceding the date of the determination of eligibility.
Expenses are defined in three categories, all of which are deductible

138. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-3, pt. 1, at 8 (2001) (explaining that Section 102
implements “need based” bankruptcy reform and permits the court to dismiss a
Chapter 7 case for abuse if the debt for which the debtor seeks relief is primarily
consumer debt).
139. See id. (discussing the replacement of the current presumption in favor of the
debtor with a mandatory presumption of abuse triggered by certain criteria).
140. See H.R. 333 § 102(b) (defining current monthly income as the average
income from all sources during the preceding six month period, including any third
party assistance to household expenses, but excluding Social Security benefits and
certain other payments); see also supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying text (discussing
the exception for income below the median level of the debtor’s state of residence).
141. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text (describing the three
categories of deductible expenses).
142. H.R. 333 § 102(a)(1).
143. See id. (characterizing the means test as the criteria for determining whether
a “grant of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter”).
144. See id. (describing the eligibility requirements under the means test) .
145. See id. (describing in further detail the treatment of a particular debtor when
then income dips below a certain threshold).
146. Id.
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147

against this monthly income determination.
The first category of deductible expenses is the debtor’s monthly
148
Monthly expenses include and exclude a variety of
expenses.
149
typical living expenses. Specifically, the debtor’s monthly expenses
may include actual expenses the debtor pays that are reasonable and
necessary for care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or
150
disabled immediate family member who would be unable to pay for
151
such care otherwise. Deductible monthly expenses can also include
actual expenses up to $1,500 a year for a child to attend a private or
public elementary or secondary school, provided the child is
152
dependent and under the age of eighteen. The “debtor’s payments
for unsecured debts” is the main expense that is not deductible from
153
the monthly income determination.
The second category of deductible expenses is monthly payments
154
These payments are the sum of amounts
on secured debts.
contractually due to secured creditors in each of the sixty months
following the date of the petition, and any additional payments to
secured creditors necessary to maintain possession of the debtor’s
primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property that serves as
collateral for secured debts but is also required to support the debtor
155
and the debtor’s dependents.
That figure is divided by sixty in
order to get the monthly average, which is deductible from the
156
debtor’s total income.

147. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text (detailing the three categories
of expenses that are deductible from a debtor’s monthly income determination).
148. H.R. 333 § 102(a)(1).
149. See id. (explaining that the Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis
Handbook sets out “National Standards and Local Standards” and the list of “Other
Necessary Expenses” in order to calculate acceptable monthly expenses).
150. See id. (stating that immediate family members include “parents,
grandparents, and siblings of the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the
spouse of the debtor in a joint case who is not a dependent”).
151. An additional monthly allowance is allowed for food and clothing. See id.
(limiting this allowance to five percent of the food and clothing categories specified
by the National Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service).
152. See id. (noting that the debtor must provide documentation of such expenses
and a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary). If
the debtor is eligible for Chapter 13, the monthly expenses can include
administrative expenses of overseeing a Chapter 13 plan for the district in which the
debtor resides. See id. (limiting this deductible expense to ten percent of the
projected plan payments, as determined under schedules issued by the Executive
Office for United States Trustees).
153. Id.
154. See id. (noting that expenses due to secured creditors are deductible from the
debtor’s monthly income determination).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The third category of deductible expenses includes payments of
157
Priority claims typically include payment of
priority debt claims.
federal, state, and local taxes, and “administrative expenses incurred
158
in administration of the bankruptcy filing.”
Again, the total
amount is divided by sixty in order to arrive at the monthly expense
figure for priority claims, which is deducted from the debtor’s total
159
monthly income.
Although the Reform Act would allow these three categories of
expenses to be deducted from income, the court may deduct other
expenses if they are itemized, documented, and accompanied with a
detailed explanation of the special circumstances necessitating the
160
expenses. If a debtor fails to satisfy the means test even with these
deductions, his fate in Chapter 7 bankruptcy remains dependent
upon the median income test.
2.

Test 2: The median income test
The means test is not a debtor’s only opportunity to obtain a
Chapter 7 discharge. Under the Reform Act, if a debtor satisfies the
median income test, a debtor is allowed to receive a discharge under
161
Chapter 7 despite failing the means test. The median income test
compares a debtor’s monthly income with the median monthly
162
income in the debtor’s state of residency.
If a debtor’s current monthly income, assuming the debtor lives in
a household of one, when “multiplied by twelve is equal to or less
than . . . the median family income of the applicable State for one
163
earner last reported by the Bureau of the Census,” then the debtor
can still procure a Chapter 7 discharge despite failing of the means
164
In the cases of households with more than one person, the
test.
filing cannot be dismissed when the household income is less than
the State’s median family income with the corresponding number of
157. See id. (stating that payments made on priority claims, such as child support
and alimony, are deductible from the debtor’s total monthly income).
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)-(9) (2000) (listing expenses and claims in order of
priority for a bankruptcy proceeding).
159. H.R. 333 § 102(a).
160. See id. (creating another exception from the monthly income total for a
demonstration of special circumstances necessitating additional monthly expenses or
an adjustment to the monthly income determination). House Bill 333 clearly
specifies that there can be no reasonable alternative to the additional expenses in
order to demonstrate a special circumstance. Id.
161. See id. (explaining that a court can deny a motion to dismiss or convert if the
debtor’s monthly income multiplied by twelve is between 100 and 150% of the
median income in the debtor’s state of residency).
162. Id.
163. H.R. 333 § 102.
164. Id.
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people in the household.
For example, a debtor living in the State of Massachusetts with a
spouse, two children, and a yearly household income of $70,000 will
be eligible to seek a Chapter 7 discharge regardless of a failure of the
means test because the median income of a four person household in
166
1999 in Massachusetts was $71,689. If that same family lived in the
State of Missouri, however, the debtor would not be eligible for relief
under the median family income test because the median income for
167
a four person household in Missouri in 1999 was $56,673.
In
Missouri, the debtor would be ineligible for a discharge under
Chapter 7, and would be required to withdraw the bankruptcy
petition or seek relief under a Chapter 13 repayment plan.
3. Exceptions: Special circumstances and bad faith
As discussed in Part II.B.1-2, an exception for special circumstances
exists to allow additions to formulations of income and expenses that
may make a difference in a debtor’s successful passage of either the
168
means test or the median income test.
The court determines
special exceptions and a debtor must present extensive
documentation to persuade the court to make special additions or
169
subtractions.
On the other hand, there is an exception to eligibility for a
170
Chapter 7 discharge if there is evidence of bad faith.
Even if a
particular debtor meets the requirements of either the means test or
the median income test, a court can dismiss a Chapter 7 filing or
convert a filing to Chapter 13 if the court finds that the debtor filed
the petition in “bad faith” or if the “totality of the circumstances” of

165. See id. (stating that in the case of a debtor from a household exceeding four
individuals, the median income will be compared to the highest median family
income of the applicable State for a family of four or fewer individuals last reported
by the Bureau of the Census plus $525 per month for each individual in excess of
four).
166. See U.S. Census Bureau, Median Income for 4-Person Families, by State (Mar. 2,
2002) (providing information regarding four-person family median income by state),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html (last revised Aug. 22,
2002).
167. See id. (revealing that Missouri’s four-person family median income is
approximately average for the incomes of all fifty states).
168. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the special circumstances
exception to the Reform Act).
169. See H.R. 333 § 102 (noting that while a determination of special
circumstances is left to the discretion of the court, extensive documentation
providing background and supplemental information regarding the special
circumstances is required before the court begins to employ its discretion).
170. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the bad faith exception
to the Reform Act).
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171

the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.

III. ANALYSIS: BANKRUPTCY REFORM AT THE RIGHT TIME
AND IN THE RIGHT PLACE
Critics and supporters of bankruptcy reform have long debated
measures similar to the Reform Act. This Part addresses these
contentions and analyzes the Reform Act in the context of these
arguments.
A. The Legal Justifications: A Universally Applicable Test
As noted in Part I.D, the circuit courts have used three different
tests to determine how to apply the substantial abuse requirement
172
These circuit court cases represent the
under the current system.
range of the significance that courts place on the ability to repay
173
when making a substantial abuse determination.
Although the
significance of the ability to repay varies, it is a constant factor
174
relevant to any Chapter 7 judicial inquiry.
When courts determine a debtor’s ability to pay, they construct a
175
“hypothetical Chapter 13 plan for the debtor.” Under Chapter 13,
if the trustee or holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of a proposed plan, the court cannot confirm the plan
unless the debtor either pays the claim in full or dedicates all of his
176
177
disposable income to the plan for a period of three years. Once
the court determines the monthly disposable income, the amount is
multiplied by the number of planned payments, which is usually over
178
a thirty-six month period. The projected amount is a percentage of

171. See H.R. 333 § 102 (including in the totality of the circumstances analysis
whether the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need
for such rejection as sought by the debtor).
172. See discussion supra Part I.D (highlighting the three modes of interpretation
of “substantial abuse”).
173. See Mitchell, supra note 94, at 365 (arguing that the four circuit court
opinions are best viewed on a “continuum with the Ninth Circuit’s Kelly and the
Eighth Circuit’s Walton at one end, the Fourth Circuit’s Green at the other, and the
Sixth Circuit’s Krohn somewhere in the middle.”).
174. See id. at 368 (stating that “regardless of which test is used, a debtor’s ability to
pay his debts is relevant to the outcome.”).
175. Id. at 368.
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1998) (defining disposable income as “income
which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be
expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor. . . .”).
177. See id. (explaining that Chapter 13 plans cannot be extended over a longer
period than three years unless the court extends that period for “cause”).
178. See Mitchell, supra note 94, at 369 (describing the process by which disposable
income is determined over a three-year Chapter 13 plan period).
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the debt owed and is the focal point for determining ability to
179
repay.
There is no bright line test for determining what percentage of
180
disposable income triggers a presumption of an ability to repay.
However, the courts that have set a minimum standard have generally
held that if a debtor can pay “more than 50% of his/her debts
through a Chapter 13 plan, [the case is likely to be dismissed] for
181
substantial abuse of Chapter 7.”
Although a great deal of uncertainty exists as to what clearly
constitutes an ability to repay under the current structure, the
Reform Act clarifies this question and imposes a universal legal
182
standard. Despite the fact that the means test and median income
183
test are lengthy and laced with definitional details and exceptions,
they provide a common standard by which every individual seeking
relief under Chapter 7 will be evaluated.
Critics of the Reform Act argue that the clarity of law is not as ideal
184
as one might think, positing that an unambiguous provision can
prevent the judicial system from responding to cases that involve
185
abuse yet meet the statutory requirements for a discharge.
The
typical example illustrating this proposition is an individual with
sizable unsecured debts who seeks a full discharge and stops working
for the six month period prior to determination to reduce his
monthly income to the point at which he could pass either test for
186
eligibility under Chapter 7.
This scheme is likely to fail in procuring a discharge under the
Reform Act for one key reason: it would trigger the bad faith
187
exception, noted in Part II.B.3, and be summarily dismissed.
179. See id. at 369-70 (stating that the percentage of disposable income that a
debtor can pay toward his debts is the decisive factor in ascertaining an ability to pay
for current substantive abuse determinations).
180. See id. (noting that there is always uncertainty as to which court will require
what percentage in an ability to repay analysis).
181. In re Vianese, 192 B.R. 61, 70-71 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); see also In re Smith,
No. 94-01953, 1995 WL 20345, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 11, 1995).
182. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing the uniformity of the law
incident to the means and median income tests).
183. See id. (presenting the details of the means and median income tests).
184. See Jack F. Williams, Ruminating on the Proposed Bankruptcy Bill, 20-AUG AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 6, 45 (2001) (noting that most key provisions throttle discretion of
bankruptcy judges, relegating them to administrators).
185. See Reid, supra note 124, at 19 (explaining that “experts anticipate many
individuals will manipulate their financial status by reducing their present income or
by artificially inflating their debts in order to qualify for relief under the proposed
Chapter 7.”).
186. See id. (presenting theories on how the debtors can abuse the proposed
Reform Act).
187. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (describing the bad faith exception to
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Courts can use the bad faith exception as a safety net to allow the
judicial system to freely maneuver and intercept suspicious activity
188
within the confines of the means test and the median income test.
Therefore, the reform provides the best of both worlds: legal clarity
and enforceable maneuverability.
B. The Moral and Social Justifications:
A Fresh Start to Only Those Who Need It
Although bankruptcy law may appear to be purely economic in
189
nature, in many ways it also serves as social legislation. Lending
190
transactions implicitly include a moral obligation of repayment.
This obligation of reciprocity is derived from both social pressures
191
However, in some circumstances an
and religious doctrines.
192
individual’s debt repayment is simply impossible.
Therefore,
morally speaking, bankruptcy should be a vehicle for forgiving the
193
needy while preventing abuse and avoidance of obligations.
Avoidance of the moral responsibilities incident to acquisition of
194
debt has tremendous implications for society.
For example, the
“rejection of economic obligations by filing [for] bankruptcy tears at
the web of reciprocal relationships that underlies society” and can
have profound and far-reaching consequences on other areas of
195
society.
Most notably, rejecting these obligations can have a
eligibility under the Reform Act).
188. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (presenting the means and median income
tests).
189. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law As Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
393, 394 (2001) (noting that bankruptcy law essentially creates a system of “legalized
post-contractual opportunism” that is only justified by the moral principle that an
honest but unfortunate debtor is entitled to discharge their debts).
190. See id. at 397-98 (explaining the web of reciprocal promises between lender
and borrower symbolizes the essence of humanity causing people to feel a natural
affinity to satisfy their promises and expect the same from others); see also Rafael
Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 162-67 (1998)
(discussing how many religions encourage debt repayment and the avoidance of
bankruptcy).
191. See Zywicki, supra note 189 at 398-99 (noting that Christianity, Islam, Judaism,
and Hinduism foster in their believers a moral code emphasizing the importance of
debt repayment and the avoidance of bankruptcy). For example, the Golden Rule is
“a rule that exemplifies the reciprocity that underlies the social and economic
system.” Id. at 398.
192. See id. at 398-99 (implying that despite these religious commands there are
always situations when reciprocity is not possible and the debtor’s moral obligation of
reciprocity is no longer required).
193. See id. at 399 (discussing bankruptcy’s tension between helping the needy and
avoiding abuses of the system’s benefits).
194. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text (describing the social
implications of debt avoidance).
195. Zywicki, supra note 189, at 400, 405. Zywicki espouses that a healthy, free,
and prosperous society can be imagined as a “three-legged” stool in which all three
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negative impact on efficient economic activity by undermining trust
196
in transactions. When there is a lack of social trust in an economy,
more resources are needed to monitor and enforce promises, thus
197
preventing economic expansion.
Additionally, in order for
democracy and the rule of law to prosper, social trust and reciprocity
198
This rule of law is “rooted in notions of
must be maintained.
reciprocity, namely that political leaders and subjects owe reciprocal
199
obligations to one another.”
If the foundation of reciprocity is
200
undermined, political obligations, such as in democracies, weaken.
Without reciprocity, majorities would create systems of repression,
rather than freedom.
Evidence of this symbiotic relationship can also be demonstrated
on an individual level; an individual’s ability to break promises, in the
form of debt avoidance, may “spill over” and corrupt the individual’s
201
responsibility and reciprocity in other areas of life.
Additionally,
legs are necessary for society to prosper. Id. at 400-01. The three legs are “(1) a
market economy, (2) democratic politics under a rule of law, and (3) healthy
institutions of civil society that inculcate habits of reciprocity and personal
responsibility in one’s citizens.” Id. Each leg is dependent upon the strength of the
other legs, and each must work together with the other legs to bear the burden of
supporting freedom, prosperity, and individual happiness. Id. Therefore, when the
“leg” of reciprocity and personal responsibility are undermined by an easily
accessible bankruptcy system, the other legs of the stool are affected. Id.
196. See id. at 401-02 (discussing how suspicion and irresponsibility are not found
in the most prosperous economies because economic rewards come to citizens who
fulfill their duties of morality).
197. See id. (stating that societies with higher degrees of social trust tend to grow
faster economically and are wealthier than low-trust societies because fewer resources
are used to monitor and enforce promises and leaving increased resources for
economic expansion).
198. See id. at 403 (“[The] concept [of reciprocity] underlies the birth of the
concept of the rule of law in Western Europe and its eventual evolution into the
concept of constitutions that bind sovereign and subjects alike.”).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 403-04 (noting that weak relations of morality and civil society
provide “shallow soil for planting the seeds of economic and political freedom”).
Poland offers evidence that strong moral and civil relations stimulate economic
growth because the transition there to a free market economy and democratic
politics can be attributed to the flourishing Catholic Church and labor unions,
despite previous Communist control. Id. In Poland, these institutions “provided a
structure of morality and institutional legitimacy that inculcated the social trust on
which economic and political freedom could grow.” Id.
201. Id. at 405. There is a strong correlation between bankruptcy filing rates and
divorce rates suggesting that bankruptcy and divorce are caused by an individual’s
inability to keep promises when obligations become costly or difficult to maintain.
See id. (noting this thesis should be distinguished from the argument that divorce
causes bankruptcy by creating financial distress; the argument here is that
bankruptcy and divorce correlate when measured against the independent variable
of an individual’s propensity to break promises); see also F.H. Buckley & Margaret F.
Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 205 (1998) (analyzing statistical
data indicating that social variables, such as divorce coefficients, complete the
analysis of bankruptcy filing rates).
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unchecked irresponsible behavior may tacitly encourage similar
202
As a result,
behavior in persons associated with bankruptcy filers.
there is little incentive for an individual to sacrifice by living within
his means while the neighbor next door lives extravagantly and is free
203
of financial burdens with little or no consequence.
A bankruptcy
system that promulgates the moral obligations of reciprocity and
responsibility will ensure that the social consequences discussed
above are avoided.
The Reform Act reinforces these moral obligations by
implementing the means test, which addresses morally repugnant
204
discharges by limiting Chapter 7 filing to needy debtors.
Studies
205
206
have estimated that anywhere between one and five billion dollars
annually can be repaid by debtors, who under current law, receive a
total discharge of debts. This range of repayable debt represents
numerous broken promises that weigh down society. The institution
of the means test will aid in insuring that debts are repaid and the
ideals of reciprocity are pursued. The median income test, on the
other hand, will help to insure that the needy have an avenue of
recourse at their disposal. Therefore, both moral objectives of
bankruptcy are fulfilled.
202. See Zywicki, supra note 189, at 406-07 (noting that the current bankruptcy
system rewards irresponsible behavior and penalizes individuals living within their
means; consequently, more and more Americans end up walking away from their
debts rather than facing the challenge of living within their means and fulfilling their
responsibilities).
203. See id. (noting that current consumer bankruptcy trends contradict the
morality of Aesop’s fable of the grasshopper and the ant that highlighted the
importance of planning ahead, diligent saving, and a strong work ethic).
204. See discussion supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (detailing the means
test).
205. See GORDON BERMANT & ED FLYNN, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES,
INCOMES, DEBTS, AND REPAYMENT CAPACITIES OF RECENTLY DISCHARGED CHAPTER 7
DEBTORS 5 (1999), at http://www.abiworld.org/legis/reform/eoust-99jan.html
(considering a variety of factors that would reduce the amount over median income
debtors could repay; the authors concluded that approximately $1 billion could be
repaid annually through a means test) (on file with the American University Law
Review). See also Marianne B. Culhane & Michael M. White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy for a Test Drive: Means-Testing for Real Chapter 7 Debtors 2, at http://www.abi
world.org/research/creightonstudy.html (1998) (uncovering similar amounts of an
additional four billion dollars, to the Bermant/Flynn study that could be repaid by
over-median income debtors) (on file with the American University Law Review).
206. See J. Barron & M. Staten, Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on Petitioners’ Ability to
Pay, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (1997) (basing findings on
2,441 Chapter 7 cases filed during 1996 in thirteen cities); see also Gordon Bermant &
Ed Flynn, Incomes, Debts, and Repayment Capacities of Recently Discharged Chapter 7
Debtors, American Bankruptcy Institute (July 8, 1999) (basing results on a study
including 2,220 cases drawn from all ninety judicial districts that were filed during
1997) (citing T. Neubig & F. Scheuren, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitioners’ Ability to Repay:
the National Perspective, ERNST & YOUNG L.L.P. (1998)), available at
http://www.abiworld.org/ legis/reform/eoust-99jan.html.
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In terms of the individual, the Reform Act will provide statutory
incentives for debtors to live within their financial means by
eliminating the tantalizing allure of frivolous and liability-free
207
spending. By living within one’s means, there is a tacit promotion
of personal responsibility in other areas of life. Therefore, the
208
Reform Act will not only stop the “bleeding” caused by current law,
but also help to promote a systemic sense of an individual’s moral
obligations to repay his debt.
C. The Economic Justification:
Promoting the Availability of Affordable Consumer Credit
As the U.S. economy lingers in a recession, the economic impact of
209
As critics
the bankruptcy reform becomes increasingly important.
of the Act have emphasized, at a time of economic retraction, the last
thing consumers need is a bankruptcy reform that limits their access
210
to Chapter 7 relief. However, the Reform Act may actually stave off
the growth of a potentially harmful economic reality:
the
unavailability of consumer credit.
A primary concept in lending transactions is the distribution of risk
211
and the maximization of profits.
A primary rule in this regard is
207. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing how the means and median
income tests will help reduce the amount of debtors who may be able to repay a
portion of their debt).
208. See discussion supra Part I.C (describing current consumer bankruptcy
eligibility).
209. Greg Ip, It’s Official: Economy Is in a Recession, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at
A2. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the United States
economy slipped into a recession during March of 2001. Id. The Bureau defines a
recession as a “widespread decline in economic activity lasting more than a few
months,” and is determined by assessing a variety of factors including “industrial
production, employment, real incomes, minus government benefits, and real
wholesale and retail sales.” Id.
210. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Today’s Bankruptcy Headlines: Sept. 11 Plays
Role in Opinions During Bankruptcy Panel Meeting, Daily Bankruptcy Review (Nov. 15,
2001), at http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/TODAY.html (citing Senator Paul
Wellstone’s statement that “[i]n the best of times, this bill would be terrible for
consumers and regular working class families, but its effects will be all the more
devastating now that we have a weakening economy.”) (on file with the American
University Law Review). House Judiciary Committee ranking member John Conyers
noted that “[w]hile our nation is engaged in a recession and has a military
engagement abroad, I strongly object to what is about to happen in this
conference . . . [while] the economy is shrinking. Half a million people lost their
jobs last month and more are losing them each day.” Id.
211. Rocco I. Debitetto, Comment, Bankruptcy Reform in Light of Increased Consumer
Filings: Means-Testing Employed to Prevent Long-Run Economic Impacts on Consumers and
to Cure Debtor Abuse Under the Current Bankruptcy Code, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 641, 646-47
(2001) (highlighting the “bedrock” economic principle that “‘individuals and firms
engaged in consumer credit transactions always act as profit maximizers’”) (quoting
Phillip Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 66, 71 (1977)). These maximized profits are directly and positively
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that the cost of lending is directly proportional to consumer interest
rates and inversely proportional to the quantity of funds supplied by
212
creditors. The cost of lending is “alternative lending opportunities
foregone in lieu of making a loan to a consumer, many of which may
213
be less risky.”
Applying the aforementioned rule, the riskier the
consumer loan, the higher the interest rates will be and as a result,
214
creditors will be more hesitant to fund these risky loans.
Applying these two concepts to the current bankruptcy crisis, it
becomes evident that the current situation is not favorable for
215
consumers.
The primary risk for a consumer lender is that the
216
borrower will enter into bankruptcy. With the current bankruptcy
system in which Chapter 7 discharges are on the rise as a result of
217
debtor abuse, the risk for lenders increases proportionally. As the
risk grows, the interest rates for consumer loans rises and the quantity
218
of funds available for loans decreases. In the end, the costs will be
219
passed on to the consumer.
220
The sluggish economy compounds the problem for consumers.
Increased lending costs and decreased credit availability are the last
thing that an economy desperately seeking an influx of consumer
221
spending needs.
If credit is harder and costlier to obtain,
correlated to risk. William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy:
The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 21 n.20 (1977).
212. See Meckling, supra note 211, at 16, 21 (explaining that the funds available to
a particular group of borrowers is completely elastic when interest rates are
appropriately set within that market). Thus, when a consumer has a higher risk
coefficient, interest rates will be higher but the market for funds will remain
responsive to shifts in the supply and demand curves. Id. at 21. As profit maximizers,
lenders have a strong incentive to minimize administrative costs and mitigate any
possible losses from insolvent borrowers. Id. at 22.
213. Debitetto, supra note 211, at 647.
214. See id. at 648 (expounding upon the role of lenders as profit maximizers in
pursuing a “riskless” rate of return and requiring sufficient compensation for risks
beyond a minimum threshold of risk).
215. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (indicating how the current
situation indicates that the cost of consumer credit will increase and the supply will
decrease).
216. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 649 (explaining that this risk will, in turn, be
passed on to consumers by raising the interest rates on loans).
217. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (describing the recent rise in
consumer bankruptcy filings).
218. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 647-48 (presenting the “distribution of risk”
equation).
219. See id. at 649 (estimating that the loss passed on to consumers in the form of
higher interest rates approaches a revolving balance of $300 per household
annually).
220. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (highlighting data indicating the
current situation of the U.S. economy).
221. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 650 (noting that the long term impact of an
increase in credit prices or a reduction in available credit will adversely affect the
overall economy).
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consumers will be forced to cut back on purchasing “big ticket” items,
222
The
such as vacations, requiring the use of unsecured credit.
reduction in consumer spending lowers business sales and profits and
exacerbates the current economic conditions the United States
223
faces. As a result, businesses trim their payrolls in order to budget
224
for this decrease in sales and more consumers lose their jobs.
Implementation of the Reform Act is a step towards assuring that
those circumstances do not materialize. The Reform Act’s means test
will restrict Chapter 7 discharges and therefore, decrease creditor
225
risk.
The size of this risk reduction is arguable. Reports indicate
that the creditors would annually recover anywhere from one to five
billion dollars due to implementation of the means and median
226
income tests. Whatever the actual figure turns out to be, it will still
be a sizable return of money and a proportionate decrease in creditor
227
risk.
228
Applying the economic theory of risk mentioned above, the
borrowing rates of creditors should decrease in proportion to
creditor risk, while the amount of available credit will increase
because the quantity of funds is inversely proportional to the creditor
229
risk.
Therefore, the Reform Act will help to ensure that, over the
long-run, consumers will have the affordable, unsecured credit
necessary to buy those “big ticket” items that will help reinvigorate
230
the economy.
Critics have been quick to point out that despite the recent rise in
consumer bankruptcy filings, credit card companies have not
231
responded with rate increases. Although the data provided by the
222. See id. (explaining that state usury laws will not stop lenders from recouping
costs through additional surcharges or increased annual fees).
223. See generally RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 483-501 (7th ed. 1984)
(discussing macroeconomic theory as it relates to unemployment and the impact
unemployment has on an efficiently running economy).
224. See id. (discussing the impact that a reduction in consumer spending will have
on employment rates).
225. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the means test).
226. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (citing studies identifying the
amount of debt that creditors could recoup with the implementation of the means
test).
227. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship
between creditor risk and the cost and availability of credit).
228. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
229. See Debitetto, supra note 211, at 650 (discussing the impact of the
“distribution of risk” analysis on the current economy if the means test is not
implemented).
230. See id. at 647-50 (connecting rampant bankruptcy with a decrease in
affordable or available unsecured credit).
231. See Brobeck, supra note 129 (presenting data indicating that credit rates
remain at a consistent rate of eighteen percent despite the increase risk of default
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232

Consumer Federation of America supports this assertion, the data
does not prove that this Comment’s argument that rates will rise in
the future is inapplicable. In the short term, consumer credit
suppliers are likely to accept the increased risk incident to the rise in
consumer filings because “creditors are slow to change lending
233
This result
patterns to adjust to the increased cost of lending.”
explains the lack of change in the cost of consumer credit over the
past few years, and supports the argument that rates may rise in the
future.
Once this equation is factored into a long-term analysis, it appears
that the worst is yet to come for consumers. Consumer lenders, while
slow to react to the increased cost of risk, will eventually respond and
234
adjust rates accordingly to take into consideration the risk factor.
Therefore, it appears as though further harm to consumers is
235
Further, there is evidence indicating that consumers
imminent.
may already be out of time. The Consumer Federation of America
study, which concluded that credit rates have remained steady the last
few years, conceded that “banks have raised prices for some of their
236
riskiest customers.”
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
THE LEGISLATION AND LET THE HEALING BEGIN!

PASS

237

As the economy lingers in a recession and the number of
238
consumer bankruptcies continues to spiral out of control, it is clear
that something needs to be done. This Comment strongly urges
Congress to pass, and President Bush to sign, the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001 as soon as possible for three reasons. First, through the
imposition of the Reform Act’s means and median income tests, the
current law on eligibility under consumer bankruptcy will become

under the current bankruptcy system).
232. See id. (presenting data that indicates no short-term rate effect incident to the
increased risk in the extension of consumer credit).
233. Debitetto, supra note 211, at 648.
234. See id. at 648-49 (noting that, in a long-run analysis, lenders will eventually
adjust their rates to reflect any increased costs of lending).
235. See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105, 107 (1999) (noting arguments that the current American
bankruptcy system essentially imposes an annual $400 “bankruptcy tax” on
consumers by passing on increased costs of lending incurred by creditors to
consumers).
236. Brobeck, supra note 129.
237. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (presenting data illustrating the
condition of the U.S. economy).
238. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing the seventy-two percent rise
in consumer bankruptcy filings between 1994 and 1998).
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239

clear and unified.
Second, the Reform Act’s means test and
median income test restrict morally and socially repugnant
bankruptcy discharges while ensuring that debtors deserving a “fresh
240
start” actually receive one. Third, by restricting access to Chapter 7
bankruptcy through the means test, the costs of lending will decrease,
thereby increasing consumer spending that can aid in reinvigorating
241
the economy.
U.S. bankruptcy law has come a long way from its inception at the
242
Throughout history, it has
Constitutional Convention in 1787.
243
been tailored to meet the needs and problems of society.
It has
become increasingly evident that now is the time for another
re-adaptation so that our bankruptcy law can be responsive to the
economic problems facing our country today. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2001 is that needed and appropriate re-adaptation.

239. See discussion supra Part III.A (presenting a uniform legal standard as a
justification for enacting the Reform Act).
240. See discussion supra Part III.B (presenting the facilitation of reciprocity as a
social justification for enacting the Reform Act).
241. See discussion supra Part III.C (presenting the preservation of available and
affordable consumer credit as an economic justification for enacting the Reform
Act).
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing “uniform laws of bankruptcy”).
243. See discussion supra Part I (presenting a historical analysis of the U.S.
bankruptcy system).

